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TAX CONSEQUENCES OF NON-SHAREHOLDER
CONTRIBUTIONS TO CORPORATE CAPITAL*
THE Internal Revenue Code of 1954 changes the tax treatment of non-share-
holder contributions to corporate capital. Non-shareholder transfers of money
or property to corporations ordinarily are designed to permit capital expansion
or subsidize operating expense.' Although courts properly noting that donative
intent is lacking in such subsidies have consistently refused to classify them as
gifts, 2 they have also been unwilling to allow a tax on all subsidization.
Accordingly, certain subsidies have been classified as contributions to capital
and excluded from the corporation's taxable income. The doctrine excluding
such contributions was developed by courts examining'individual subsidies
when the tax depreciability of the related assets was not questioned. 3 But ex-
clusion and depreciation combined to offer a double tax benefit-receiving the
asset tax-free, a corporation could later deduct depreciation from taxable in-
come. 4 Recognizing the impropriety of the double benefit, courts narrowed the
definition of capital contribution in order to curtail the possibilities of corpora-
tions deriving this advantage. In so doing, they departed from the precedent
determining taxability on the basis of a contribution's intended use and intro-
duced other tests for making this determination. 5 In the 1954 Code, section
118 adopts the former judicial exclusion of capital contributions,6 but section
362 eliminates the prior practice allowing depreciation deductions. 7 Section
*Teleservice Co. of Wyoming Valley, 27 T.C. No. 84 (Jan. 29, 1957).
1. See notes 9-11 infra and accompanying text.
2. See Detroit Edison Co. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 98 (1943); Edwards v. Cuba
R.R., 268 U.S. 628 (1925).
3. See notes 8-10 infra and accompanying text.
4. See MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME 391-92 (rev. ed. 1945) (recommending inclusion in
gross income and allowance of subsequent depreciation deductions) ; Freeman & Speiller,
Tax Consequences of Subsidies to Induce Business Location, 9 TAx L. REV. 255, 263
(1954); Rottschaefer, The Concept of Income in Federal Taxation, 13 MiNN. L. REv.
637, 668-69 (1929) ; Note, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 757, 760 (1950).
5. See notes 13-15 infra and accompanying text.
6. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 118 reads:
"[Iln the case of a corporation, gross income does not include any contribution to
the capital of the taxpayer."
The term "contribution to capital" first appeared in the federal income tax statutes
in Revenue Act of 1932, § 113(a) (8) (B), 47 STAT. 200, re-enacted without change in Int.
Rev. Code of 1939, § 113(a) (8) (B), 53 STAT. 42, which provided a basis for property
acquired as a contribution to capital. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 118 was the first statu-
tory exclusion of contributions to capital from gross income. The leading case of judicial
exclusion is Edwards v. Cuba R.R., 268 U.S. 628 (1925).
7. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 362(c) provides:
"[I]f property other than money is acquired by a corporation ... as a contribution
to capital, and is not contributed by a shareholder as such, then the basis of such
property shall be zero.
"[I]f money is received by a corporation ... as a contribution to capital, and is
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362's elimination of this added benefit invites a re-examination of the definition
of capital contributions.
8
The function which a given subsidy was designed to perform originally
determined its classification as a capital contribution or taxable income. Judicial
exclusion of capital contributions from taxable income originated in Edwards
v. Cuba R.R. And the doctrine there announced, that government subsidiza-
tions of capital outlays were capital contributions, was followed in later de-
cisions.' ° On the other hand, government contributions designed to subsidize
operating expenses, or to maintain a guaranteed level of income were readily
held taxable income to recipient corporations." Since the former type of sub-
sidy, through furnishing capital assets, gives the corporation capacity to earn
income, while the latter compensates it for income not earned, this dichotomy
rests on the functional nature of each subsidy. In developing this functional
approach to taxability, however, the courts did not consider that holding a
subsidy to be a capital contribution entailed the added benefit of subsequent
depreciation deductions.1
2
Later courts, disturbed by the effect of depreciation deductions, departed
from a functional approach and analyzed taxation of subsidies in terms of the
contributors' motives. In Detroit Edison Co. v. Commissioner, the corporation
had required prospective customers to subsidize the capital expansion necessary
to provide them with electricity. 13 Finding that the contributors expected
"direct" benefits, the Court viewed the subsidies as prepayments for services,
which constituted taxable income rather than contributions to capital.' 4 But in
not contributed by a shareholder as such, then the basis of any property acquircd
with such money ... shall be reduced by the amount of such contribution. The
excess (if any) of the amount of such contribution over the amount of the reduction
under the preceding sentence shall be applied to the reduction ...of the basis of
any other property held by the taxpayer."
Shareholder contributions to capital continue to give rise to tax deductible depreciation.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 362(a) (2).
When the contribution has consisted of money rather than property the courts have
had no difficulty in relating assets subsequently acquired to the funds thus contributed.
See, e.g., Detroit Edison Co. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 98, 102 (1943).
8. Re-examination is forcibly suggested by SEN. RP. No. 1622, 83d Cong.,, 2d Sess.
18 (1954) which states that § 118 "in effect places in the code the court decisions on this
subject."
9. 268 U.S. 628 (1925).
10. Southern Ry. v. Commissioner, 74 F.2d 887, 890 (4th Cir. 1935); Commissioner
v. Norfolk So. R.R., 63 F.2d 304, 306 (4th Cir. 1933) ; Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 17 B.T.A.
1135, 1162 (1929). See S. E. Overton Co., 2 B.T.A. 1160 (1925) ; S. E. Overton & Co.
v. Holden, 15 Am. Fed. Tax R. 521 (D. Mich. 1927).
11. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. United States, 286 U.S. 285 (1932); Boston Elevated Ry. v.
Commissioner, 131 F.2d 161 (1st Cir. 1942); Kansas City So. Ry. v. Commissioner, 52
F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1931).
12. No cases decided before Detroit Edison Co. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 98 (1943),
considered the interrelation of depreciation allowances and exclusion of capital contribu-
tions. See, e.g., cases collected in notes 10, 11 supra.
13. 319 U.S. 98 (1943).
14. The initial judicial tendency was to adhere strictly to the Cuba doctrine. See,
e.g., Rio Electric Co., 9 B.T.A. 1332 (1928). In a series of decisions involving customer
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Brown Shoe Co. v. Commissioner, a civic group subsidization of corporate
relocation was held a capital contribution on the ground that the expected bene-
fits would be general to the community and "indirect" to the contributors. 15
Contributor motivation as the test of taxability was further emphasized in
Tcleservice Co. of Wyoming Valley-the latest pronouncement on capital con-
tributions subject to a depreciation allowance.", The corporation agreed to
furnish rural antenna service to prospective televiewers who subsidized con-
struction of the system. 17 While holding the subsidies to be taxable income
on the authority of Detroit, the court introduced a new method of viewing
subsidization. Altruistically inspired subsidies were to qualify as tax-free capital
contributions; those motivated by self-interest became prepayments for services
and thus taxable income.'
8
But contributor motivation is an improper standard for judging capital
contributions. Whether the contributors receive direct customer benefits by
inducing the corporation to expand its plant and facilities or indirect community
benefits through effecting corporate relocation, the subsidies are still designed
to enlarge the corporation's capital, not to increase its income through reducing
its operating expenses. Moreover, the benefit test of Detroit overlooks the
economic reality that indirect community benefits are often much greater than
those received by prospective customers.:' And the contractual obligations
contributions for the expansion of utility company services, the recipient companies were
held not to have received income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment.
Tampa Electric Co., 12 B.T.A. 1002 (1928); Wisconsin Hydro-Electric Co., 10 B.T.A.
933 (1928); Rio Electric Co., supra. Although only the deductibility of depreciation
was at issue in Detroit, the Court stated that "neither in form nor in substance" were
Detroit Edison's customers contributing anything to the company. 319 U.S. at 102. And
the decision has been interpreted as overruling the earlier line of cases. See Freeman &
Speiller, supra note 4, at 258; O'Meara, Contributions to Capital by Non-shareholders,
3 TAx L. R-v. 568, 571-72 (1948) ; Mandell, Do Subsidies Constitute Taxable Income?,
26 TAXEs 323 (1948).
15. 339 U.S. 583 (1950).
Cases involving contributions to capital made by civic groups prior to the 1954 Code,
once decided on the authority of Cuba, must now come under the narrower doctrine of
Brown in order to avoid the Detroit holding. This suggests that when individuals within
the civic group are to receive "direct" benefits, the capital contribution category may not
be applicable. But see Freeman & Speiller, supra note 4, at 262, arguing that Brown over-
rules rather than distinguishes Detroit.
16. 27 T.C. No. 84 (Jan. 29, 1957).
17. Non-business televiewers applying for services after the system was partially
completed were only required to make reduced contributions; and once the necessary capital
outlays were completed, no contribution was demanded from such applicants. 27 T.C. No. 84,
at 5. A contribution only made customers eligible to receive services; actual use of the system
was then paid for at the regular monthly rates. Ibid. This was the arrangement in Detroit,
Reply Brief for Petitioner, p. 8 n.1, Detroit Edison Co. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 98
(1943), and is a general pattern in the customer contribution situation. See cases collected
at note 20 in!ra.
18. 27 T.C. No. 84, at 9. A similar distinction has previously been made. See Babo-
quivari Cattle Co. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1943).
19. "The two big shoe companies, International Shoe and the Brown Shoe Company,
both emphasized that in almost all cases their pay rolls have far exceeded the
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imposed on corporations in exchange for subsidization demonstrate that all
non-shareholding contributors expect substantial long-range benefits. In addi-
tion to making their product available to contributors,2 0 for example, corpora-
tions have been required to remain in their new location for a given period 21
or to maintain a minimum payroll.2 2 These restrictions also indicate that the
Teleservice refinement of the benefit test is unrealistic.
Through adding the requirement of altruism, Teleservice exaggerates the
impropriety of contributor motivation as a test of taxability. Altruism is a
more stringent requirement than donative intent: although many donors are
not altruistically motivated their donative intent is often unassailable. ' '1 Yet,
to the extent that taxability of subsidizations has been determined by the con-
tributor's intent, this standard has always been recognized as less strict than
that regulating gifts. 24 Since recipients of capital contributions receive fewer
tax benefits than donees under the 1954 Code, it seems reasonable to maintain
less restrictive requirements for the former category.25 Further, the Teh'-
service court indicated that it might consider only government sudsidies suf-
ficiently altruistic to receive non-recognition treatment..2 6 Not only is this posi-
guarantee[d minimum]. Each company justifies the subsidy by the importance
of the indirect benefits to the commercial and professional people of the community."
McLAUGHLIN & ROBOCK, WHY INDUSTRY MOVES SOUTH 113-14 (1949). The importanc.,
of the "indirect" benefits expected may be gauged by the size of the contribution made.
Freeman & Speiller, supra note 4, at 257 n.13, report that a Tennessee community offered
a relocating paper plant a contribution of $20,000,000.
20. Detroit Edison Co. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 98 (1943) ; Reply Brief for Peti-
tioner, p. 8 n.l., ibid.; Decatur Water Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 88 F.2d 341 (7th Cir.
1937) ; Rio Electric Co., 9 B.T.A. 1332 (1928).
21. Brown Shoe Co. v. Commissioner, 339 U.S. 583 (1950) ; Watervliet Paper Co.,
16 B.T.A. 604 (1929) ; Frank Holton & Co., 10 B.T.A. 1317 (1928).
22. Commissioner v. McKay Products Corp., 178 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1949); C. L.
Downey Co. v. Commissioner, 172 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1949); S. E. Overton & Co. v.
Holden, 15 Am. Fed. Tax R. 521 (D. Mich. 1927).
23. See, e.g., Speaker v. Keating, 36 F. Supp. 556 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds,
122 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1941) (primary motive for inter vivos gift to child was to prevent
husband from inheriting statutory share).
24. Edwards v. Cuba R.R., 268 U.S. 628, 632 (1925) (although capital contributions
not considered gifts because of contributor's self-interest, subsidy not disqualified as capitai
contribution). See Allen v. Smith, 173 U.S. 389, 402 (1899) ("bounties granted by a
government are never pure donations"). See also PAUL, SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL
TAXATION 164 (2d ser. 1938).
25. INT. REy. CODE OF 1954, § 102 excludes gifts from the donec's taxable income.
Section 1015(a) provides, generally, that the donee acquires the donor's basis. In contrast,
§ 362, see note 7, supra, restricts the basis of property contributed by non-shareholders to
zero.
26. "We think that the Supreme Court, in deciding the Cuba Railroad case, did not
intend that the theory of that case should be extended so as to free from taxation a
private contribution made in consideration of the performance of the contributee's
normal business function." (Emphasis added.)
27 T.C. No. 84, at 9. Earlier, the court indicated that Teleservice is to be distingui.hscd
from Cuba because in the former case the contributors were non-governmental and sc1fish,
while in the latter "governmental and altruistic." Ibid.
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tion inconsistent with the Brown holding under the 1939 Code, it cannot be
reconciled with present congressional reports and Treasury regulations which
clearly extend the application of section 118 beyond the scope of government
contributions.
27
Moreover, with section 362 denying depreciation deduction for assets at-
tributable to capital contributions, the Detroit and Teleservice tests are no
longer purposeful. In Detroit the Court sought to confine the concept of capital
contributions in order to preclude corporations from receiving tax-free sub-
sidies and then recouping "through untaxed depreciation accruals on invest-
ment it ... refused to make."'12 8 Teleservice, which followed Detroit, was pre-
sumably based on the same unwillingness to allow double tax benefits.29
Of course, excluding subsidies from a corporation's taxable income works
to its advantage regardless of depreciation allowance. Absent this exclusion,
the entire contribution would be taxable in the year received. 30 Further.
retention of the amount saved from taxation with its attendant earning power
is clearly preferable to a long-term, problematical recoupment through de-
preciation deductions. While Congress has expressly countenanced this ad-
vantage, it has foreclosed double tax benefits .by enacting section 362. And
since 362 directly accomplishes the result sought by Detroit and Teleservice,
their tests need not be retained.
In addition, the prepayment of services rationale in Detroit and Teleservice
should be irrelevant to classification of the questioned subsidy under the 1954
Code. True, subsidization of a capital outlay is a form of prepayment in that
the costs of acquiring new capital assets, which the corporation would normally
pass on to its customers, are paid in advance. But the fact of prepayment does
not require treating such subsidies as taxable income under the 1954 Code.
(in the contrary, the elimination of depreciation allowance suggests capital con-
tribution treatment. For classifying subsidizations of capital outlay as capital
contributions would equate their tax treatment with that given functionally
equivalent methods of financing corporate capital expenditures. For example,
customers wishing to subsidize corporate expansion could purchase $100,000
of corporate bonds with no tax consequences to the corporation.3 ' Assuming
the principal of the bonds to be due in twenty years and the interest payable
at $5,000 a year, the corporation, amortizing its liability on the principal, woul1
27. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1954); U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.118-1
(1957). See 7 MERT.Ns, FEDERAL INcomm TAXATION § 38.20 (Zimet ed. 1956); G.C.M.
16952, 1937-1 Cuzi. BULL. 133.
28. 319 U.S. 98, 103 (1943).
29. Although Teleservice Co. did not claim an immediate depreciation deduction, the
court must have been unwilling to make the double benefit possible by entering a contrary
holding. For the court expressly relied on Detroit which was directly concerned with
precluding the double benefit. 27 T.C. No. 84, at 9; see text at note 28 supra.
30. 27 T.C. No. 84. But see text at notes 41, 42 in!ra.
31. See Union Land Co. v. Commissioner, 45 F.2d 944 (7th Cir. 1930); Southport
Mill, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 38 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1930) ; Townsend-Ueberrhein Clothing
Co v. Crooks, 41 F.2d 66 (W.D. Mo. 1930).
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charge these customers $10,000 a year more than if they had contributed the
$100,000. Since this $10,000 additional taxable income to the corporation would
be offset by a $5,000 a year interest payment deduction 32 and a $5,000 annual
deduction for depreciation, computed straight-line for twenty years on the
assets purchased with the $100,000, 3 3 the resulting tax consequences would be
neutral over the twenty year period. And when the bonds became due the
corporation would have recouped its $100,000 liability through the additional
charges. If the financing were effected in a transaction which qualified under
section 118, these additional charges would be unnecessary, and the corporation
would have neither the depreciation nor the interest paid deductions. Thus
the economic and tax consequences to the corporation would be identical under
either transaction.
Concomitantly, contributors would experience equivalent results under either
a capital contribution or bond transaction. In a capital contribution, con-
tributors would relinquish the initial $100,000 plus the interest that could be
earned on this amount. If, instead, the bond transaction were utilized to effect
the subsidy, the customers would initially pay $100,000 and would receive
$5,000 each year as bond interest. When this $5,000 is deducted from the
$10,000 additional annual charge, the customers would in effect be paying
$5,000 a year more for services than they would be in the case of a capital con-
tribution. In the course of twenty years, this annual charge would amount
to the $100,000 which they would recover as return of the bond principala
4
With a total outlay of $300,000 and a total receipt of $200,000, the bond holding
customers would experience the same loss of principal as if they originally
had made a contribution to corporate capital. Moreover, assuming the prevail-
ing interest rate to be 5 %, the customers would lose the same amount of
interest in each case. The interest on the bonds, amounting to $5,000 a year,
can be set off against one-half of the additional charge. The other half of that
charge causes the bond holding customers a $5,000 net annual expense. Thus
their lost interest equals the simple interest on $100,000 for twenty years plus
the compound interest on an annual increment of $5,000 for the same period.
This is identical to the lost interest of the capital contributors--compound
interest on $100,000 for twenty years. Non-business customers, however, would
experience relative tax disadvantages in the case of a bond transaction; the
$5,000 a year bond interest would be taxable income,35 while the additional
service charges would not be deductible.30 But since this tax disadvantage
would be divided among many customers, and since business customers could
deduct the excess charges,3 7 the tax consequences would generally be similar
32. INT. Rrv. CODE OF 1954, § 163(a).
33. Id. § 167(a) (1).
34. This recovery would not be taxable unless the retirement payment amounted to
more than the original cost. Id. § 1232(a) (1).
35. Id. § 61(a)(4).
36. Id. § 262.
37. Id. § 162.
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under either a section 118 or bond transaction. In any event, the identical
economic consquences to the corporation militate in favor of achieving identical
tax consquences by classifying subsidizations of capital outlay as capital con-
tributions.
Admittedly, a similar tax result could be achieved by taxing the subsidy pro
rata over the useful life of the related asset. The relevant analogy lies in the
cases considering the taxability of prepayments for services to accrual tax-
payers. Where such prepayments have been held taxable in the year received.
the decisions rest on the recipient's complete control over the prepaid amount.3 8
But customer contribution cases invariably involve imposition of elaborate re-
strictions on use of the subsidies.39 Thus those cases in which 'accrual tax-
payers had only restricted use of prepayments are applicable. And taxation
of prepayments in such cases has been based upon an allocation of the prepaid
amounts to the years in which the services were to be rendered.40 Similarly,
sudsidies would be allocated over the useful life of the related asset for purposes
of taxation. And since deductions for depreciation of the subsidized assets would
be allowed, the resulting tax consequences would remain neutral.
41
38. South Dade Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1943); Your
Health Club, Inc., 4 T.C. 385 (1944) ; South Tacoma Motor Co., 3 T.C. 411 (1944). See
also Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281 (1944) (customer prepay-
ments for processing tax held income in year received, though tax refunded to customers
when taxing statute held unconstitutional).
39. See notes 20-22 supra.
As long as the recipient corporation is contractually bound to acquire capital assets
with contributed funds, and is restricted in the use of such assets, it should not be required
to segregate these funds on its books. Cuba did not require the capital contribution to be
earmarked in the recipient's books in order to insure allocation of the contributed funds
for the agreed upon capital purpose. See Fletcher, Taxability of the Government Subsidy,
12 GEO. WAsHI. L. REv. 245, 281-82 (1944). Nevertheless, in order to distinguish the Cuba
situation more effectively from that involved in Texas & Pac. Ry. v. United States, 286
U.S. 285 (1932), see note 11 supra and accompanying text, some courts have insisted
upon bookkeeping mechanics. See Lykes Bros. S.S. Co. v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 725
(5th Cir. 1942) ; Baboquivari Cattle Co. v. Commissioner, 135 F2d 114 (9th Cir. 1943 ).
40. Woodlawn Park Cemetery Co., 16 T.C. 1067 (1951) ; Veenstra & DeHaan Coal
Co., 11 T.C. 964 (1948); Summit Coal Co., 18 B.T.A. 983 (1930).
41. Under existing law, subsidies held to be income are taxed in their full amount
in the year received. See note 30 and accompanying text supra. But Congress has approved
the accrual taxpayer's allocation of prepaid income to the years in which earned, irrespective
of the quantum of control over the prepaid amount. INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, § 452 (repealed
by 69 STAT. 134 (1955)). Repeal was forced upon Congress by administrative and revenue
considerations having no bearing upon the principle of § 452; the congressional debates
show a clear legislative intent to re-enact, at some future date, a similar provision without
the loopholes unwittingly drafted into § 452. 101 CNqG. REc. 3686, 7084 (1955).
While a § 452 solution may be feasible with respect to customer contributions of the
Detroit and Teleservice variety, it would be difficult to apply to relocation subsidies. For
relocated corporations benefit communities indefinitely, thus making a realistic allocation
of these contributions extremely difficult. Since the .capital contributions category has
greater utility in relocation situations, and since an application of § 452 or of § 118
would yield identical results in the case of customer contributions, it seems preferable to
treat qualified subsidizations as capital contributions.
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However, classifying subsidizations of capital as capital contributions with-
in section 118 is more consistent with the economic nature of such subsidies.
4 -
The characteristic restrictions on use, by limiting the corporation's interest in
a subsidy to effecting the contractual purpose, preclude initial realization of
economic gain. Such restrictions require the corporation to utilize the subsidy
in the contemplated business activity. Since any other use would be a breach
depriving the corporation of all interest in the subsidy, the realizable economic
gain is necessarily produced by the business activity. 43 Instead of immediate
gain, then, the corporation in fact receives a source of future income. Although
such income is clearly taxable, the source-capital-from which it derives
should be beyond the scope of income taxation. 44 Accordingly, subsidizationm
of capital outlay should be recognized as contributions to capital, excluded from
taxable income by section 118, but giving rise to future income taxable under
section 61.
42. For a summary of the economic arguments, see Freeman & Speiller, supra note 4,
at 276-77.
43. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
44. Edwards v. Cuba R.R., 268 U.S. 628, 633 (1925) (these subsidies not "income
within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment"). The district court opinion, 298 Fed.
664 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), contains a full exposition of this principle. See United States v.
Oregon-Washington R.R. & Nay. Co., 251 Fed. 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1918), where Judge
Learned Hand observes that income
"unquestionably imports, at least so it seems to us, the current distinction betwecn
what is commonly treated as the increase or increment from the exercise of some
economically productive power of one sort or another, and the power itself, and
it should not include such wealth as is honestly appropriated to what would custom-
arily be regarded as the capital of the corporation taxed."
See also Harvey, Some Indicia of Capital Transfers Under the Federal Income Tax Laws,
.37 Mica. L. Rzv. 745 (1939). But see MAGILL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 386; Rottschaefer,
supra note 4, at 669.
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